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Over the past two decades, more than half the population in our sample of rural 
Tanzanians has migrated out of their home-communities. We hypothesize that this 
powerful current of internal migrants is changing the nature of traditional institutions 
such as informal risk sharing. Mass internal migration has created geographically 
disperse networks, on which we collected detailed panel data. By quantifying how 
shocks and consumption co-vary across linked households we show that, while both 
migrants and stayers insure negative shocks to stayers, there is no one in the network 
who insures the migrants’ negative shocks. While migrants do share some of their 
positive shocks, they ultimately end up nearly twice as rich as those at home by 2010, 
despite practically identical baseline positions in the early nineties prior to migration. 
Taken together, these findings point to migration as a risky, but profitable endeavour, 
for which the migrant will bear the risk and also reap most of the benefit. We interpret 
these results within the existing literature on risk-sharing and on the disincentive 
effects of redistributive norms.   
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1.  Introduction 
If, in the next decades, Africa catches up with the rest of the world, then that will almost 
certainly coincide with intergenerational mobility out of rural into urban areas and out of 
agriculture into non-agricultural activities (Lewis 1954; Harris and Todaro 1970). 
Historically, in both rich developed countries and fast-growing developing countries, this 
type of migration has moved in lockstep with development and poverty reduction (Collier 
and Dercon 2014). Recently, China’s urban population officially surpassed its rural one: of 
China’s 1.35 billion people, 51 percent lived in urban areas at the end of 2011, rising from 
less than 20 percent in 1980 (UN, 2012). Furthermore, UNDP (2009) reports that of the one 
billion migrants worldwide, three-quarters are internal migrants. With international 
migration open to only very few Africans, we should expect massive internal migration to 
form a core part of the development process.  
The scale of this demographic process is captured in the data that form the basis of this 
paper, further motivating our focus on internal migration. These data are part of an 
exceptional panel data set from the Kagera region in Tanzania, spanning nearly two decades 
of migration and development. The 2004 and 2010 follow-up surveys attempted to trace all 
6,353 individuals listed on the baseline 1991/94 household rosters and re-interview them 
irrespective of their location. Once we exclude the 1,275 individuals who had died by 2010, 
we are left with 4,996 baseline individuals whose 2010 locations are known.1 Of those, 45 
percent were found residing in the baseline village, 53 percent had migrated within the 
country, 2 percent to another East African country (primarily Uganda) and 0.3 percent had 
moved outside of East Africa. This region – not atypical of remote rural Africa – is clearly 
on the move, with internal migration dwarfing international migration.  
                                                 
1 We lack location information on 82 individuals. Because this is after multiple attempts through various 
sources it is unlikely that these individuals have moved outside of East Africa. Information on such an 
important, low-occurrence event is unlikely to be hidden.  
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We attempt to understand how this powerful current of internal migration, which is part and 
parcel of the modernization process, interacts with a traditional institution like informal risk 
sharing to shape economic mobility and vulnerability. This is a key question because, as 
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006, p. 1230) put it  
[...] a complete understanding of the development process must not only take account 
of the initial conditions and the role of existing institutions in shaping the response to 
modernization and globalization, but must also consider how these traditional 
institutions are shaped in turn by the forces of change. 
Our analysis departs from a number of other studies in the migration literature by focusing 
on consumption instead of transfers. This choice of the outcome variable is motivated by the 
fact that risk sharing and other economic exchange could happen through a multitude of 
different mechanisms, of which transfers is just one. Other mechanisms could include 
looking for a job for someone, employing them directly, providing them with tips, advice or 
a network link, or providing migration opportunities (Munshi 2003). By analysing 
consumption we focus on the joint and final effect of all such mechanisms. 
Work using the 2004 follow-up round has shown that geographical mobility in rural 
Tanzania is associated with large income gains (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2011). We 
will reiterate that point by showing that despite only minor welfare differences during the 
1991-94 baseline survey, those who moved out of the region to other parts of Tanzania have 
grown roughly twice as rich as those who did not by the time we interviewed them again 
nearly two decades later in 2010. As we are measuring consumption and not income, it is 
clear that the main beneficiaries of this migration-led growth were the migrants themselves 
and certainly not their relatives who remained at home.  
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But did these migrants simply leave and never look back, or did they maintain links with the 
home community? The empirical contribution of this paper is to investigate this question by 
exploiting the fact that the 4,282 individuals interviewed in 2010 are grouped in 816 
geographically disperse extended family networks. We quantify how household consumption 
responds to shocks experienced by other households in the extended family network. We 
find that while everyone suffers from own negative shocks, only the shocks to stayers 
negatively affect the consumption of other network members. There is no network reaction 
to migrants’ negative shocks, suggesting they are not insured within the network. Those who 
stay at home do not seem to bear any of the negative shocks of those who move, but neither 
do they fully share the migrant’s growth. Stayers do share some of the migrant’s positive 
shocks and also receive insurance from these migrants against their own negative shocks, but 
migrants still outgrow stayers by a factor of 3, realising a growth of 120% over the survey 
period compared to 40% for the stayers. By 2010 migrants have become nearly twice as rich 
as those at home, whereas they were similar in observable wealth in 1991/94.  
Because selection into migration is unlikely to be random, our analysis will remain 
inconclusive as to whether migration is causing these empirical facts.  We cannot make any 
statements about what would have happened if migrants had stayed home or the stayers had 
migrated. It is possible that in this parallel universe roles would have switched (migration is 
causally responsible) or not (it is driven by the unobserved differences between migrants and 
non-migrants). All indications are, however, that prior to migration the (future) migrants did 
not assume any different position in the network compared to stayers. The same holds for the 
position taken up post-migration by return migrants.  
We then discuss how we can understand the two important stylized facts that emerge from 
this paper – migrants grow much richer and become unilaterally responsive to stayers’ 
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shocks – within the existing literature. Our results cannot be easily explained within existing 
models of risk sharing (Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1992; Coate and Ravallion 1993; 
Townsend 1994; Fafchamps 1999; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000; Ligon, Thomas, and 
Worrall 2002; Genicot 2006), nor within models of exchange (Lucas and Stark 1985; 
Hoddinott 1994). The results are more consistent with the existence of obligations of 
migrants toward those who remain at home. This could be in the form of a debt being paid 
back state-contingently, or through redistributive norms and altruistic feelings towards the 
home-community (Platteau 2000; Cox and Fafchamps 2007; Burke and Young 2011). Our 
analysis speaks further to an emerging literature that worries about the disincentive effects of 
such redistributive norms. Baland, Guirkinger, and Mali (2011) show how people take out 
costly loans in order to conceal their income, while Platteau (2014) sees migration as a 
means to escape the prying eyes and incessant demands of the kinship group. The kinship 
poverty trap model of Hoff and Sen (2006) predicts possible resistance from the home 
communities as they feel threatened by productive forces leaving and severing links with 
home to escape taxing demands for assistance. Anticipating this, the home community may 
set up subtle exit barriers, which could lead to below-optimal levels of migration.  
Sections 2 and 3 describe the data and econometric model, respectively. Section 4 presents 
the main empirical findings and contains further robustness checks. Section 5 interprets the 
results within the existing literature and provides a concluding discussion.   
2. Data and descriptive analysis 
Kagera is a region in the north-western part of Tanzania. A large part of Lake Victoria is 
contained within this region and it shares a border with Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. The 
region is overwhelmingly rural and agricultural production is the most important source of 
income, with more than 80 percent of the region’s economically active population engaged 
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in it (URT 2012). Bananas, beans, maize, and cassava comprise the main food crops while 
coffee, tea, and cotton are important cash crops. Recent years have seen a rise in vanilla and 
horticulture for use as cash crops. According to the 2012 census, the region has a population 
of roughly 2.5 million people (URT 2013). 
The Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) was originally designed and 
implemented by the World Bank and the Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences. 
It consisted of 915 households from 51 villages that were interviewed up to four times from 
autumn 1991 to January 1994.2 The KHDS-2004 survey aimed to re-interview all individuals 
that were ever interviewed in the baseline survey and were alive in 2004. This effectively 
meant that the original household panel survey turned into a panel of individuals. A full 
household questionnaire was administered in a household where a panel respondent was 
found residing. Due to household dynamics, the sample size increased to more than 2,700 
households.3 The second KHDS follow-up was administered in 2010 with this time more 
than 3,300 households interviewed.4  
Although KHDS is a panel of individuals and the definition of a household loses meaning 
after 10-19 years, it is common in panel surveys to consider re-contact rates in terms of 
households. Excluding households for which all previous members were deceased the KHDS 
2004 field team managed to re-contact 93 percent of the baseline households. In 2010, 92 
percent of the initial households were re-contacted. Taking into account the long, 12 or 18 
year periods between surveys, the attrition rates in KHDS-2004 and KHDS-2010 are 
extremely low by the standards for such panels (Alderman et al. 2001).  
                                                 
2 See World Bank (2004). 
3 See Beegle, De Weerdt and Dercon (2006). 
4 Whereas the 2004 round was conducted on paper, the 2010 round was conducted on handheld devices 
(Caeyers, Chalmers, and De Weerdt 2012). De Weerdt et al (2012) provide a full overview of the survey. 
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This paper exploits the fact that the survey includes all tracked split-offs from the original 
household and contains particularly rich information on the current links between them. The 
2004 sample contains 4,430 individuals originating from 830 initial households. The 2010 
sample has 4,282 individuals, originating from 816 initial households. In 2004, the average 
baseline household had spawned 3.3 households out of which 1.6 were non-migrant and 1.7 
were migrant households. In 2010, the average baseline household had 4.1 households out of 
which 1.8 were non-migrants and 2.3 were migrants. In what follows we will refer to these 
networks as extended family networks.  
In this paper we will define a migrant as anyone who has moved out of the baseline village. 5 
By this definition 37 percent of the sample is considered migrant in 2004 and 48 percent in 
2010. Details on where they were found in 2010 are given in Figure 1.6 
[Figure 1 here] 
These internal migration flows described above are associated with structural 
transformation.7 Table 1 shows that out of the 1,850 migrant households in 2010, only one-
third reported agriculture as their main income generating activity. For the 1,460 non-
migrant households this is 65 per cent. More than 25 per cent of the migrant households 
engage in informal or formal wage employment and 11 per cent are self-employed in the 
non-agricultural sector. Furthermore, migrants who move farther from the baseline village 
are less likely to engage in agriculture and more likely to be in wage employment.  
[Table 1 here] 
                                                 
5 Our results are robust to alternative migrant definitions, such as also defining households that moved to a 
nearby village as non-migrant households.  
6 Similar figure for the 2004 round is presented in Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011). 
7 This is also documented by Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Todo (2013) who use the same data to study the 
role of urbanization and diversification in poverty reduction. 
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Table 2 provides an overview of the reasons for leaving the baseline village. More than one-
third of the female respondents but none of the male respondents cited marriage as the 
reason for migrating, which is what one would expect in a culture with patrilocal marriages. 
Less than 15 percent of the female respondents reported that they left because of work. In 
contrast, almost 45 percent of the male migrants reported to have moved because they had 
found work or went looking for work.8  
[Table 2 here] 
The consumption data originate from extensive food and non-food consumption modules in 
the survey, carefully designed to maintain comparability across survey rounds and to control 
for seasonality. The aggregates are temporally and spatially deflated using data from a price 
questionnaire included in the survey. Consumption is expressed in annual per capita terms 
using 2010 Tanzanian shillings. 9 
Using the 1991-2004 panel Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011) document how migrants 
grow much richer than their family members who did not migrate. Table 3 provides the 
summary of the consumption and poverty developments of the panel respondents with 
respect to their 2010 location. On average, consumption levels in the sample almost doubled 
over 19 years. Individuals who stayed in their community saw their consumption increase by 
more than 40 percent. Consumption growth for migrants was much higher: those who left 
Kagera saw their consumption nearly triple over the same two decades. The poverty statistics 
tell the same story: nearly all respondents who left the region managed to escape poverty, 
while poverty reduction among non-migrants was more modest. These descriptive statistics, 
                                                 
8
 Despite these differences in migration motives across the two gender groups, we do not find any statistically 
significant differences in risk sharing provision between male and female migrants. Results are not reported but 
available upon request.  
9 Using adult equivalent units as the denominator instead of household size produces almost identical results 
across all specifications. 
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which reinforce the results reported in Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011), form the first 
stylized fact documented in this paper: migrants grow much richer than those who stay. 10 
[Table 3 here] 
After moving, migrants remain linked to extended family members at home: 90 percent of 
the migrants in the 2010 round report that they communicated with a non-migrant network 
member in the 12 months preceding the survey. Migrants who maintained some form of 
communication experienced an average consumption growth of 110 percent, while those 
who did not grew by 88 percent. 11 This difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. The severing of the most basic links does not seem to be associated with higher 
consumption growth; if anything, the reverse is true.  
We use data from shock modules administered in 2004 and 2010. During both of these 
rounds, the panel respondents were asked to consider each year between the survey rounds 
and indicate whether a particular year was, in economic terms, 'Very good', 'Good', 'Normal', 
'Bad', 'Very bad'. For each 'Very bad' response, the respondents were asked to provide the 
main reason for the hardship. We consider each 'Very bad' response as a negative economic 
shock and each 'Very good' response as a positive economic shock. More than 60 percent of 
the panel respondents reported experiencing at least one negative shock between 1994 and 
2009. The positive shocks were less frequent with 37 percent of the respondents reported 
experiencing one or more. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the shocks experienced. Most frequently reported negative 
shocks were death of a family member, serious illness and poor harvest due to bad weather. 
                                                 
10 This finding is not driven by the fact that migrants are the younger generation. The divergence between 
migrants and stayers observed in Table 3 remains even if we net-out the age-effects. Results available upon 
request from the authors. 
11 The mean consumption growth among those who maintained contact was 394,679 TZS and among those 
who severed links 286,991 TZS. 
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Good harvest and high-income from wage employment and crop prices were the most 
frequently reported positive shocks. 
[Table 4 here] 
The shock data were collected at the individual level – in particular for each person on the 
2004 and 2010 roster who also appears on the original 1991/94 rosters. Since our focus is to 
examine the role of shocks on consumption that is defined at the household level, the data 
had to be reformatted from the individual to the household level. If at least one individual in 
the current household reported to have experienced a shock, we interpret it as a household 
level shock. We should also exclude shocks that occurred before the households split. 
Fortunately, we know the year in which the respondents out-migrated, allowing us to include 
only shocks that occurred at least one year after this move.  
Furthermore, some of the shock categories are problematic to our network analysis. 
Mortality shocks may trigger inheritance flows within extended families. A negative shock 
in one household may then actually be a positive income shock in another household. A 
similar problem arises with the (positive or negative) remittance shocks, if these capture the 
loss of transfers from a household within the same extended family. We therefore exclude 
these two shock categories from our final shock variables. 
Another worry is that we are only measuring a subset of relevant shocks. First, if shocks are 
self-reported then respondents may fail to mention those that were effectively insured. 
Second, the extended family network in the home community may extend beyond the 
networks as defined in our data. Fortunately, the survey provides an alternative shock 
measure, which is community-wide and not self-reported. We have historical rainfall data 
from the Tanzanian Meteorological Agency for gauges in 212 weather stations in Kagera 
and at the migration destinations in our sample. The drawback is that this shock measure 
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does not allow us to quantify positive shocks: too much rain is not good for yields, especially 
when it falls in the wrong season (e.g. when the beans are drying in the field).  We therefore 
treat this exercise as robustness check for the self-reported negative shocks.  
In a first step, each household is linked to all rainfall stations within a 100 km radius. Next, a 
monthly rainfall figure is calculated, for each household, by weighing each monthly rainfall 
reading with the inverse of the distance of the rainfall station where it was recorded to the 
household in question. The mean distance to the nearest rainfall station is 17 km (median 9 
km) among the 2004 households and 30 km (median 10 km) among the 2010 households. 
For each household we can calculate average monthly z-score deviations of rainfall during 
the two rainy seasons, in relation to the 30 year average (1980-2010) for that village. 
Rainfall shocks are then constructed by truncating the positive yearly average rainfall 
deviations to zero. We calculate a non-migrant household’s own shock as the most negative 
shock in the five years prior to the interview round. 
Table A1 of the Appendix presents the summary statistics for the final sample of 4,782 
individuals (resulting in a total of 8,430 observations) by migration status. Migration is not 
random and Table A1 shows how migrants are more likely to be female, are younger, and 
have more years of formal education.12 Section 4 discusses how the endogeneity of 
migration comes to bear on the interpretation of our results. 
3. Econometric Model 
Table 3 illustrates the basic result of Beegle et al. (2011) and is the departure point of this 
paper: despite small differences at baseline, migrants grow much richer than those who 
remain at home. The migrant’s growth, therefore, does not seem to be shared with family at 
home. Our contribution is to measure the extent to which own consumption of migrants and 
                                                 
12 These reported differences are statistically significant. 
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stayers is affected by negative shocks to others in the network. In particular, we ask whether 
stayers and migrants are differentially insured within the network and will find that indeed 
they are: while both migrants and stayers remain responsive to the shocks of stayers, neither 
is responsive to the shock of migrants. We will provide further evidence that prior to the 
move stayers and (future) migrants were responsive to each other’s shocks, showing that the 
special status of the migrant in the relationship coincided with the physical move. 
The outcome variable in our econometric analysis is logged per capita consumption in period 
𝑡 ∈ {2004, 2010}, for individual 𝑖 in extended family 𝑗 (ln 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡). The vector of own shock 
variables is 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡, one for negative and one for positive shocks. The shock variables obtain a 
value 1 if the individual experienced a shock in the previous five years and zero otherwise. 13 
The vector of network shock variables, 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡, measures the number of households in the 
network affected by an income shock. As before this vector contains both positive and 
negative network shock variables. The shocks that occurred in individual’s own household 
are excluded from these variables. 
All individuals were living in the same household j at baseline. Some also shared a 
household in 2004 and 2010. We will remain agnostic about how to treat this continued 
grouping of individuals into households in the follow-up surveys. In the main analysis we 
will think in terms of a network – and a panel – of individuals. It is, however, important to 
consider that both our outcome variable and our shock variable are measured at the 
household level. Therefore, every individual gets assigned the logged consumption value 
ln 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 and own shock value 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 of the household in which he or she lives. Consequently, the 
network shock variable, 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡, is a count of the number of households containing at least one 
network member, that have received a shock. Our analysis will cluster the standard errors at 
                                                 
13 If t=2004, we consider shocks that took place in 2003-1999. If t=2010 the shock window is 2009-2005. Our 
results are robust to considering t-1 shocks only; i.e. 2003 if t=2004 and 2009 if t=2010 (see Section 4). 
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the network (j) level and the robustness section will redo the whole analysis at household 
level.  
The use of consumption as the outcome variable has the advantage that it incorporates all 
forms of assistance, including more subtle forms of assistance that could hurt one’s own 
position or have an opportunity cost in terms of time (employing a relative, helping with job 
search, house sharing, and the like). Furthermore, other forms of exchange, the outcomes of 
which are consumed within the survey period, are captured in a final consumption figure. 
Consumption is attractive because it is the bottom-line sacrifice someone has made, after all 
is said and done. 
We model logged per capita consumption in period 𝑡 ∈ {2004, 2010}, for individual 𝑖 in 
extended family 𝑗 as: 
(1) ln 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡′𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡′𝛿 +  𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛾 + ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜈 + 𝑤𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜗 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,  
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is a vector of individual time-invariant characteristics, such as sex, age and a 
number of baseline characteristics such as relation to head, marital status and education 
relative to age-specific peers (and its quadratic term). 14 These characteristics are likely to 
influence the current level of consumption but also the role taken by the individual regarding 
insuring others in the network. To control for the life-cycle effects associated with 
consumption and risk sharing, age is modelled through age interval dummies (see Table A1 
for details on how they are defined). The variable ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 includes time-variant individual 
characteristics, such as relation to the individual’s current household head, which may 
correlate with consumption and the level of insurance provision in the network. The variable 
                                                 
14 A number of individuals in our data had not yet completed schooling in 1991-94. A raw measure of 
education would consequently be highly correlated with age. To circumvent this problem, we follow Beegle, 
De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011) in computing the years of schooling relative to peers, and use that variable in 
our empirical analysis. 
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𝑤𝑗𝑡
′  captures the time-variant network characteristics comprising the number of migrant and 
non-migrant households in each period. The term 𝛼𝑗 represents the network fixed effect and 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. The standard errors are clustered by network.
15 If shocks matter – and 
they are not completely smoothed within the network – we expect β < 0. 16 Finding 𝛿 < 0 
implies that individual consumption is negatively affected by income shocks to others in the 
network (some of the individual shock gets absorbed by the extended family).  
After running Equation (1) on the pooled sample, we run it separately for migrants and non-
migrants to establish whether there is any differential responsiveness to network shocks 
between these two groups. In the final version of Equation (1), we will also split the network 
shock variable into shocks to migrants in the network and shocks to stayers in the network to 
explore heterogeneity in that dimension.  
The ability to include network fixed effects (NFE) makes this specification particularly 
powerful. First, the inclusion of NFE means that we compare the impact of shocks between 
the individuals originating from the same baseline household. The NFE control for all time-
invariant observable and unobservable network characteristics. In particular, through NFE 
we control for aggregate resources (e.g. income, assets) in the network. Moreover, they also 
capture the level of inequality within the network. It may well be that the decision to split or 
to migrate will be related to the level of risk sharing provided in the baseline household. In 
                                                 
15 The total sample of 8,430 individuals group into 779 networks. Our results hold if we cluster the standard 
errors at the baseline village level. 
16 We do not attempt to test a full-risk sharing model (e.g. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1992; Townsend 
1994). Recent literature notes that the rejection of the full risk-sharing model in this type of specification may 
stem from the violation of the assumption that risk preferences are identical within the network (Chiappori et 
al. 2011; Schulhofer-Wohl 2011; Mazzocco and Saini 2012). In a context of heterogeneous risk preferences, a 
Pareto-efficient contract allocates more aggregate risk to less risk-averse households. As demonstrated by 
Schulhofer-Wohl (2011), Chiappori et al. (2011) and Mazzocco and Saini (2012) this would lead to a upward 
bias (in absolute terms) in 𝛽 in Equation 1. The standard full risk sharing test is then biased against the null-
hypothesis of full risk-sharing. 
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particular, household division 17 or out-migration could be related to high inequality within 
the household (Foster 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 2002), which may then be correlated 
with the risk sharing arrangement after the baseline household splits – or produces a migrant. 
Fortunately, the level of inequality within the network is also captured in the NFE.  
We remain concerned about unobserved heterogeneity in who within the network decides to 
migrate. In in Section 2, we discussed how migrants are more likely to be female, are 
younger and have more years of formal education. This begs the question whether, perhaps, 
they were already the unilaterally insuring family member, even before they moved. 
We can investigate this by restricting the sample to 2,547 individuals who were identified as 
stayers in either 2004 or 2010. In other words, this new restricted sample of 4,397 
observations drops individuals who were migrants in both 2004 and 2010. Out of these 2,547 
individuals, 547 were stayers in 2004 and will move by 2010, while 202 were migrants by 
2004, but will have returned by 2010. The essence of our test is to look at whether these 
individuals had already taken on a different role in the risk-sharing networks at home (i.e. 
with other stayers) prior to their move (for the 547 future migrants) or whether they 
continued to do so after their return home (for the 202 return migrants). Interacting the shock 
variable with future or past migration status (𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡) allows us to quantify the insurance 
relation that exists between stayers, differentiated by their future or past mobility. Building 
on Equation (1), we now estimate:  
(2) 
ln 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡′𝛽1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡′𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡′𝛿1 + 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡′𝛿2 ∗ 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛾 + ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜈 + 𝑤𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜗 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 . 
                                                 
17
 By household division we refer to an event where a household splits into two or more households. Migration 
is then one, special, form of household division. 
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We exploit these migration dynamics by studying whether the risk sharing role taken by 
these mobile individuals differs from that taken on by individuals who never migrated. If the 
roles are the same, then we expect 𝛿2 = 0. 
4. Results 
Main Results 
Table 5 estimates Equation (1) for the pooled sample (Column 1) and separately for the 
migrant (Column 2) and non-migrant (Column 3) samples. The coefficient on the own 
negative shock variable appears significant in all columns implying that the shocks we are 
considering are meaningful for both migrants and non-migrants. The same is true for the 
own positive shocks with exception of the migrant column where the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels (p=0.149). The individuals in these networks 
are also responsive to negative shocks occurring to others in the same network implying that 
some level of risk sharing takes place in these networks. 18 The coefficients on the positive 
network shock variables appears insignificant in the pooled model. 
Columns 2 and 3 show that for both migrants and non-migrants, the negative network shock 
coefficient is negative whereas the positive network shock coefficient is insignificant. These 
negative network shocks have a sizeable impact on migrants’ consumption: on average, a 
shock in one household in the network results in a drop of 3.8 percent in migrant’s 
household per capita consumption. This point estimate is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Also the non-migrants are affected by these shocks with each network shock resulting in a 
2.7 percent drop in stayer’s household per capita consumption. However, the coefficient is 
significant only at 10 percent level. 
                                                 
18 Note that shocks are only weakly correlated within these extended family networks: the intra-class 
correlation coefficient for the own negative shock variable equals 0.076 with a standard error of 0.008. 
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 [Table 5 here] 
In order to investigate this further, we decompose the network shock variables into shocks in 
non-migrant and migrant households. The first network-shock variable measures the number 
of non-migrant households that experienced a shock in the extended family. The second 
network-shock variable measures the number of migrant households affected by shocks. As 
before, the individual’s own shocks have been excluded from these variables. Table 6 
presents the regression results. We see that both migrants and non-migrants are susceptible 
to negative shocks affecting non-migrant households within their extended family network, 
while negative shocks in migrant households exert no impact for either group: the coefficient 
is nearly zero and insignificant in both columns. On average, a negative shock in one non-
migrant household in the network leads to a drop of 8.8 percent in migrant household's 
consumption. This point estimate is significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, a shock in 
one non-migrant household in the same network results in a fall of 4.8 percent in non-
migrant households’ consumption. This coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. 
[Table 6 here] 
Positive network shocks that take in place in non-migrant households do not exert any 
impact on either groups’ consumption. Interestingly, however, positive shocks taking place 
migrant households appear with a positive and significant sign in the non-migrant column. 
On average, a positive shock in one migrant household in the network leads to a gain of 9.7 
percent in non-migrant household's consumption. 
These econometric results comprise the second stylized fact: negative shocks to stayers are 
insured through their migrant network and their home network, while negative shocks to 
migrants are uninsured within these networks. Stayers also benefit from positive shocks to 
migrants, but not vice versa.  
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We next turn to the question of whether migrants had this peculiar position in the network 
prior to becoming migrants – or after they returned home. To investigate this we estimate 
Equation (2), with results reported in Table 7. The results from Table 7 show that these 
future or past migrants are not more (nor less) responsive to their own and (stayer) network 
shocks compared to their sedentary network members. Put differently, while living at home 
these mobile individuals do not take on any special role in the network: they are equally 
responsive to their own and other stayers shocks as everyone else in the baseline community.   
[Table 7 here] 
Robustness 
We conducted an array of robustness checks to validate our second stylized fact.   
First, similar results hold using the rainfall shock variable. However, as discussed in Section 
2, we can only verify our results regarding the negative shocks. The first row in Table A2 
shows that rainfall shocks are important in determining consumption growth, with every 
standard deviation decrease in (negative) rainfall deviation causing consumption growth to 
decline by 7 percent for migrants and 15 percent for non-migrants.19  
Knowing that rainfall shocks drive the incomes of both stayer and migrant households, we 
can use them as an alternative network shock indicator. We replace the network shock 
variable with the baseline village rainfall shock variable in Equation (1). For migrant 
households, this rainfall shock is constructed as the most negative rainfall deviation in the 
baseline village after the migrant left. For stayer households, we take the most negative 
rainfall deviation among the migrant household locations, after the migrant left. Column 1 
reports the results for the migrant households. We see that after the migrants leave their 
                                                 
19 Although only one-third of the migrant households report agriculture as their main income generating 
activity (Table 1), nearly two-thirds cultivate land. This explains why also the migrants are susceptible to 
rainfall shocks.  
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consumption remains responsive to rainfall shocks at the baseline village. Each standard 
deviation decrease in (negative) rainfall deviation in the baseline village leads, on average, to 
a 7.5 percent fall in consumption in the migrant households. Column 2 reports the 
corresponding results for the non-migrant households. Consistent with the results presented 
earlier, we see that non-migrants are not affected by rainfall shocks that take place in migrant 
households.  
Second, the results are not driven by other important life-events such as changes in marital 
status. Table A3 of Appendix shows that that the results presented in Table 6 hold if we add 
dummies for the current marital status to the specification. 
Third, the shock variables consider the last 5 years prior t. Using shocks that happened in the 
previous year (i.e. t-1) does not alter our findings. Table A4 of Appendix shows that 
considering a shorter shock window yields similar results as in Table 6. The coefficients on 
the own shock variables turn insignificant in this specification, possibly due to the small cell 
size in this variable (less than 2 % of the full sample report a positive shock in t-1). 
Fourth, the results are not driven by the configuration of the data. We conducted the analysis 
at the individual level to facilitate better modelling of the within-network relationships and 
differences in individual level characteristics. Conducting the empirical analysis at 
household level, however, does not affect our main findings. Table A5 of Appendix re-runs 
Table 6 using household level data. 
Fifth, the demographic composition may systematically differ between the migrant and non-
migrant households. Therefore the use of per capita consumption as the dependent variable 
may not be entirely appropriate. To address this issue we defined household consumption per 
adult equivalent instead of per household member. Table A6 of Appendix provides the 
results. The shock coefficients and their standard errors are of similar magnitude. The 
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difference is that the positive migrant network shock coefficient turns insignificant in the 
non-migrant column.  
Finally, Equation (1) exploit panel data but treat repeated individual-level observations as 
independent. We addressed this concern by replacing the network fixed effects in Table 6 
with individual-level fixed effects. However, we cannot use the full sample for this exercise. 
The within-transformation requires that we have two observations for each individual. 
Therefore in the sub-sample regressions we can only consider those individuals appear either 
as migrants or non-migrants in both rounds. Column 1a and 2a in Table A7 of Appendix 
replicate Table 6 using these reduced sub-samples. The magnitude of stayer network-shock 
coefficient in the migrant column reduces by a third but remains significant at the 5 percent 
level. In column 1b and 2b we replace the network fixed effects with individual-level fixed 
effects. As expected, the use of individual-level fixed effects takes a toll on the efficiency of 
these estimates but still the stayer-network shock coefficient appears negative and significant 
at the 10 percent level in the migrant column. Of note is that the coefficient is of similar 
magnitude as in column 1a suggesting that the individual level heterogeneity is not driving 
the results in Table 6. 
5. Interpretation and concluding discussion 
We find that consumption of both migrants and stayers co-moves with own shocks. This 
empirical result holds after controlling for aggregate network resources, which indicates that 
these networks are not fully insuring their members, in line with a lot of the literature on this 
topic. Still some insurance takes place. Interestingly it is only the stayers who have their 
negative shocks insured: migrants and stayers alike cut back consumption when a stayer in 
their network is hit by a negative shock. The negative shocks of migrants, however, are not 
insured: neither migrants, nor stayers cut back their consumption when a migrant is hit by a 
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shock. Migrants share their positive shocks with stayers, but not vice versa. Further analysis 
reveals that prior to their move (future) migrants did not share risk differently with other 
stayers in the networks – any differences in how they participate in the insurance network 
seem to coincide with the physical move the migrant makes. Even though migrants lack such 
insurance from their network, they are nevertheless much more successful than those at 
home when it comes to consumption growth. While migrants more than double their 
consumption from 1991/94 to 2010, those who have remained at the baseline location grow 
by 40% over the same time period. Taken together these findings point to migration as a 
risky, but profitable endeavour, for which the migrant will bear the risk, but also reap most 
of the benefit. This can be interpreted within a number of strands of the literature, which is 
what we will do next. 
With respect to the risk sharing literature, this observed unilateral insurance relationship is 
difficult to explain within general models of risk sharing (Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 
1992; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Townsend 1994; Fafchamps 1999; Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 
2000; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2002; Genicot 2006). In particular, there should be no 
subgroups of households – delineated along exogenous or endogenous characteristics – that 
are completely unresponsive to the shocks of others. It is on this basis that we reject these 
basic risk sharing models.  
Recent work in the risk sharing literature presents a more specialized version of the risk 
sharing model that explicitly incorporates income inequality across agents. Indeed, with 
heterogeneous risk preferences, a Pareto-efficient contract allocates more aggregate risk to 
less risk-averse households (Chiappori et al. 2011; Schulhofer-Wohl 2011; Mazzocco and 
Saini 2012). Our empirical results could be consistent with an extreme version of this 
phenomenon, where the poorer, more risk-averse stayer pays an insurance premium to the 
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richer, less risk-averse migrant. In this model, migrants, in effect, sell insurance to the 
stayers and regressive transfers result  (Fafchamps 1999; Genicot 2006).  
An alternative explanation to the observed lack of reciprocity could be that migrants insure 
non-migrants in exchange for other benefits. Some of these benefits may even accrue to the 
migrant in the more distant future. Lucas and Stark (1985) mention that there could be 
exchange motives for insurance provision relating to the desire for non-migrants to look after 
local assets, the intention to return home and the aspiration to inherit. In a context that lacks 
technology to allow future income to be consumed now, we could confuse unilateral 
insurance with postponed reciprocity. De Weerdt and Hirvonen (2013) explore these 
explanations but find no support for any of the three exchange motives mentioned above.  
Of particular interest in this context is the issue of return migration. Indeed even if migrants 
do not have some of the main shocks insured some of them do return home and, as Table 7 
suggests, are reinserted in the risk-sharing system. Hirvonen and Lilleør (2015) discuss 
return migration in more detail and find that return in this context is associated with an 
unsuccessful migration experience. Returning can then be viewed as a final fall-back option 
for the migrants when everything else fails. Still, the evidence does not support the notion 
that migrants engage in strategic remittance behaviour to keep their return options open.  
We think that the unilateral insurance provision documented in this paper is more consistent 
with risk sharing motivated by social norms. Such redistributive values may have been 
instilled since childhood and carefully nurtured through oral transmission, rituals and 
ceremonies in which the importance of the kinship group is strongly emphasized (Lévi-
Strauss 1969). Remittances and other forms of assistance may buy social prestige, political 
power or serve to perpetuate subordination (Platteau and Sekeris 2010; Platteau 2014). In the 
risk sharing literature, social norms have been seen as the glue that keeps the risk sharing 
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contract from breaking apart by alleviating enforcement and information problems (Stark 
and Lucas 1988; Fafchamps 1999; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001). Theoretically this can be 
modelled as subjective satisfaction that individuals receive from participation (Fafchamps 
1999; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2011). The satisfaction can 
stem from the fulfilment of obligations and the avoidance of social sanctions, such as guilt, 
shame or ridicule, or fear of witchcraft. It can also include altruism, which we do not attempt 
to distinguish from social norms. Social norms could weaken the constraints to risk sharing 
to the extent that they never bind and allow for the existence of sustained, unreciprocated 
transfers, as documented, for example, for Paraguay by Schechter and Yuskavage (2011) and 
for Tanzania by De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011). Finally, there may be obligations the 
migrant has at home, for example related to investments in the migrant’s education or the 
financing of the move. The empirical patterns we describe could occur if migrants are re-
paying these loans state-contingently post-migration.  
We believe that our results are indicative of redistributive norms and can provide further 
interpretation with regard to possible disincentive effects that may result. Platteau (2014) 
discusses how redistributive pressures can discourage effort, entrepreneurship and risk-
taking. Regarding the latter he notes (p. 168-169) that “[...] these pressures operate in an 
asymmetrical manner: if the investment project fails, the risk taker will be the only one to 
bear the burden of the ensuing loss, while, if the project is successful, the risk taker will have 
to share the benefits with his or her kith and kin. Given a certain degree of risk aversion, a 
dynamic individual will therefore refuse to embark on a risky project that he (she) would 
have attempted in the absence of redistributive norms.” 20 The author continues by outlining 
three possible strategic reactions for dynamic individuals to undertake. First, they could 
                                                 
20 These predictions remain to be empirically verified. D’Exelle and Verschoor (2015), for example, find the 
opposite is true in a lab-in-the-field experiment in Uganda. They find that investments increase when profits 
can be shared or when losses cannot be shared.  
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engage in the strategic hiding of income and assets. An excellent example of this is Baland, 
Guirkinger, and Mali (2011), who show how people take out costly loans in order to conceal 
their income. Second, religious conversion is one strategy which could serve as a respectable 
way to distance oneself from some of the traditional obligations and to be, instead, subject to 
a new set of obligations. The final avenue would be physical separation through migration.  
With respect to this latter interpretation it is important to note that migrants are allowed to 
grow, albeit without any insurance from the home community, but also with relatively little 
tax on their wealth. Migrants do share their positive shocks with non-migrants, but, after all 
is said and done, end up almost twice as rich as stayers in 2010, while they had started from 
similar baseline positons in the early nineties. This would fit well with the idea of migration 
as an escape from the traditional kin systems. In that respect it is interesting to calculate the 
cost the migrant incurs for providing the kind of unilateral insurance we have documented 
above. From Table 6 we observe that for each negative shock in the extended family network 
at home there is a drop of 8.8 percent in the migrant’s consumption. The average migrant has 
0.45 negative network shocks of non-migrants, resulting in an implied consumption penalty 
of 4.0 percent (the 95 percent confidence interval ranges between 1.9 and 6.0 percent). 21 We 
conclude that migrants share 4 percent of their consumption with home communities through 
insurance provision. 22 
To many readers this number will seem relatively low and suggestive that migrants’ growth 
is not stifled in any significant way by the kinds of demands from the home communities 
discussed in this paper. By way of conclusion we note that also that the experimental 
literature on income hiding has come up with similar single-digit tax rates. Jakiela and Ozier 
                                                 
21 The same calculations based on the rainfall shock regressions in Table A2 of Appendix show that an average 
migrant sacrifices 4.7 percent out of their consumption to insure their network members back home. 
22 Migrants also share part of gains from their positive income shocks (Table 6). Each positive shock in a 
migrant household results in a 9.7 percent increase in non-migrant’s consumption. Since an average stayer has 
only 0.09 positive network shocks of migrants, the magnitude of the implied penalty here is very small: 0.09 
percent – expressed in terms of stayer household’s consumption. 
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(2012) find that women in a laboratory setting in Kenya purposefully reduced their income 
in order to keep it hidden. They acted as if they were expecting any observable winnings to 
be taxed at around 4 to 8 percent. Ambler (2015) reports that El Salvadorian migrants living 
around Washington DC remit 5 percent more of a windfall income if they are told that the 
organizers of the experiment will inform potential recipients at home about it. One important 
difference between these experiments and our observational data is that they look at the 
short-run reactions to windfall incomes, while we study the long-run consequences of 
reactions to actual income shocks. Another difference is that they look at how people change 
remittance behaviour when going from actual belief sets to full information, or how much 
they would be willing to sacrifice to avoid a full information state of the world. We look at 
the effect of shocks within real-world belief sets and in the context of migration.   
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Figure 1: KHDS-2010 – Re-contacting after 16+ years 
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Tables 
Table 1: Main income generating activity by migrant status in 2010 
 
non-
migrant 
HHs 
migrant HHs 
 
all 
nearby 
village 
elsewhere 
in Kagera 
outside 
Kagera 
 
% % % % % 
agriculture 64.9 33.0 51.3 41.9 8.5 
wage employment 6.2 26.8 12.0 20.1 45.8 
self-employed 8.8 11.2 10.5 9.5 14.4 
trading 11.7 17.2 17.2 15.1 20.7 
casual labour 5.5 7.6 6.7 9.5 5.3 
fishing 1.8 1.7 0.6 2.6 0.9 
transfers & savings 1.2 2.5 1.8 1.4 4.6 
number of HHs 1,460 1,850 343 917 590 
Note: Agriculture category includes farming and livestock keeping, trading 
includes agricultural and non-agricultural trading. Wage employment can be 
either formal or informal. Transfers include pensions, remittances and rental 
income. Self-employed category only considers self-employment outside 
agriculture. The information is missing for 2 non-migrant and 5 migrant 
households. 
 
Table 2: Reasons for leaving the baseline village 
Reason males (%) females (%) 
To look for work 29.8 7.5 
Own schooling 16.0 10.3 
Found work 15.1 6.7 
To live in a healthier environment 10.4 11.7 
Marriage 0.0 38.9 
Other reason 28.8 24.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
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Table 3: Consumption and poverty movements of the panel respondents in 1991-2010 
by 2010 location 
 
 mean 
1991  
 mean 
2010  
 difference in 
means   N 
Consumption per capita (TZS) by 2010 location 
Within community 343,718 492,398 148,680*** 2,224 
Migrant locations 369,190 805,702 436,511*** 2,047 
Nearby community 364,099 569,438 205,339*** 382 
Elsewhere in Kagera 357,930 695,951 338,021*** 1,007 
Out of Kagera 389,379 1,110,827 721,449*** 658 
Full Sample 355,926 642,558 286,632*** 4,271 
   
Consumption Poverty Head Count (%) by 2010 location 
Within community 31 19 -13*** 2,224 
Migrant locations 28 13 -16*** 2,047 
Nearby community 30 20 -10*** 382 
Elsewhere in Kagera 31 16 -15*** 1,007 
Out of Kagera 23 3 -21*** 658 
Full Sample 30 16 -14*** 4,271 
Note: All consumption values are in annual per capita terms and expressed in 2010 
Tanzanian shillings. Significance of the difference in means using a t-test; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Shocks reported by the panel respondents 1994-2009 
Panel A: Negative shocks 
Type of negative shock Freq. % 
Death of family member 797 26% 
Poor harvest due to adverse weather 638 21% 
Serious illness 577 19% 
Loss in wage employment 219 7% 
Loss of assets 205 7% 
Eviction/resettlement 99 3% 
Poor harvest due to pests or crop diseases 98 3% 
Low crop prices 85 3% 
Loss in off-farm employment 78 3% 
Low income due to lower remittances 43 1% 
Loss of livestock 6 0.2% 
Loss of gifts and support by organizations 4 0.1% 
Other reasons 172 6% 
Total 3,021 100% 
 
Panel B: Positive shocks 
Type of positive shock Freq. % 
Good harvest 198 25% 
High income from wage-employment 161 20% 
High crop prices 153 19% 
High income from off-farm employment 71 9% 
New assets 54 7% 
High income from remittances 23 3% 
High income from support by development organisations 16 2% 
High returns from assets 17 2% 
Extra income from livestock 7 1% 
Other reasons 104 13% 
Total 804 100% 
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Table 5: The effect of network shocks on consumption 
 
1 2 3 
 
pooled migrants 
non-
migrants 
own negative shock -0.138*** -0.078** -0.153*** 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) 
own positive shock 0.080** 0.083 0.113*** 
 (0.035) (0.057) (0.041) 
# of HHs that experienced a 
negative shock in the network 
-0.039*** -0.038*** -0.027* 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
# of HHs that experienced a 
positive shock in the network 
0.010 -0.011 0.036 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.027) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 0.082*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed 0.016 0.003 0.041** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,430 3,538 4,892 
R2 0.124 0.125 0.094 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.120 0.089 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by 
network are in parenthesis. Dependent variable is log HH per capita 
consumption. Unit of observation is panel respondent. 
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Table 6: The effect of network shocks by migrant status 
 
1 2 
 
migrants 
non-
migrants 
own negative shock -0.069** -0.160*** 
 (0.031) (0.025) 
own positive shock 0.116* 0.104** 
 (0.063) (0.042) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the 
network 
-0.088*** -0.048** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the 
network 
-0.061 -0.007 
 (0.056) (0.035) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the network 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the network 0.058 0.097** 
 (0.049) (0.048) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 0.051*** 0.050*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed 0.013 0.048*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Other controls? Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,538 4,892 
R2 0.129 0.097 
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.092 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in 
parenthesis.  Dependent variable is log HH per capita consumption. Unit of observation is panel 
respondent. 
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Table 7:  Interactions with future or past migration status 
 
non-migrants 
future or past migrant -0.060 
 
(0.044) 
own negative shock -0.196*** 
 
(0.025) 
--- * (future or past migrant) 0.018 
 
(0.044) 
own positive shock 0.129*** 
 (0.043) 
--- * (future or past migrant) -0.034 
 (0.061) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the network -0.055** 
 (0.025) 
--- * (future or past migrant) 0.002 
 (0.033) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the network -0.006 
 (0.035) 
--- * (future or past migrant) 0.108 
 (0.084) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed 0.045** 
 
(0.018) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes 
Other controls? Yes 
Number of observations 4,397 
R2 0.086 
Adjusted R2 0.081 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable is log HH per capita consumption. Unit of observation is 
panel respondent. The sample is restricted to individuals observed as non-migrants in 
t={2004, 2010}. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
 
migrants 
non-
migrants 
Male 0.396 0.529 
 
(0.489) (0.499) 
Log per capita household consumption 13.16 12.81 
 
(0.737) (0.563) 
Own negative shock 0.269 0.484 
 
(0.444) (0.500) 
Own positive shock 0.0571 0.0748 
 (0.232) (0.263) 
Number of HHs that experienced a negative shock in the network 0.832 0.789 
 
(1.072) (1.011) 
Number of HHs that experienced a positive shock in the network 0.179 0.197 
 (0.504) (0.538) 
Number of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the 
network 
0.448 0.410 
 
(0.700) (0.677) 
Number of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the 
network 
0.0842 0.108 
 (0.332) (0.370) 
Number of migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the 
network 
0.384 0.380 
 
(0.721) (0.709) 
Number of migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the 
network 
0.0947 0.0895 
 (0.327) (0.330) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 3.543 1.997 
 
(2.031) (1.839) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed 1.688 2.480 
 
(1.394) (1.510) 
Head of the current HH 0.354 0.431 
 
(0.478) (0.495) 
Spouse of the current HH head 0.371 0.176 
 
(0.483) (0.381) 
Child of the current HH head 0.114 0.262 
 
(0.317) (0.440) 
Baseline characteristics: 
  
Head or spouse 0.0825 0.299 
 
(0.275) (0.458) 
Biological child of head 0.488 0.474 
 
(0.500) (0.499) 
Grandchild of the head 0.191 0.0981 
 
(0.393) (0.298) 
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migrants 
non-
migrants 
Unmarried 0.897 0.717 
 
(0.305) (0.450) 
Unmarried male 0.361 0.409 
 
(0.480) (0.492) 
Baseline age 0-15 (reference category) 0.666 0.506 
 
(0.472) (0.500) 
Baseline age 16-25 0.239 0.185 
 
(0.426) (0.388) 
Baseline age 26-35 0.0404 0.0983 
 
(0.197) (0.298) 
Baseline age 36-45 0.0263 0.0828 
 
(0.160) (0.276) 
Baseline age 46-55 0.0130 0.0664 
 
(0.113) (0.249) 
Baseline age 56-65 0.0150 0.0615 
 
(0.121) (0.240) 
Baseline age 66+ 0.00565 0.0166 
 
(0.0750) (0.128) 
Deviation from median school years of peer group -0.117 -0.789 
 
(1.943) (2.376) 
--- squared 3.787 6.265 
 
(10.09) (12.31) 
Observations: 3,538 4,892 
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Table A2: Re-calculating insurance provision through rainfall shocks 
 
Migrants Non-migrants 
mean 1 mean 2 
max rain shock in own 
location in the past 5 years a) 
-0.84 0.072** -1.07 0.146*** 
[0.52] (0.033) [0.44] (0.039) 
max rain shock in deviation 
in baseline village a) 
-0.62 0.075**   
[0.58] (0.035)   
max rain shock in deviation 
in migrant locations b) 
  -0.94 0.018 
  [0.60] (0.035) 
Network Fixed Effects? n/a yes n/a yes 
Other controls? n/a yes n/a yes 
Number of observations 3,538 4,892 
R2 n/a 0.128 n/a 0.075 
Adjusted R2 n/a 0.123 n/a 0.071 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a) For migrants this is after they migrated. 
b) After the migrant moved to their 2004 or 2010 location. 
Standard deviations in brackets. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable is log HH per capita consumption. Unit of observation is 
panel respondent. 
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Table A3: Replicating Table 6 with additional controls 
 
1 2 
 
migrants 
non-
migrants 
own negative shock -0.083*** -0.167*** 
 (0.030) (0.025) 
own positive shock 0.105* 0.106** 
 (0.061) (0.042) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the 
network 
-0.082*** -0.048** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the 
network 
-0.060 -0.005 
 (0.058) (0.035) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the 
network 
-0.001 -0.003 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the 
network 
0.053 0.095** 
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 0.049*** 0.051*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed 0.007 0.048*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Current marital status dummies? Yes Yes 
Other controls? Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,538 4,892 
R2 0.169 0.107 
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.102 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable is log HH per capita consumption. Unit of observation is 
panel respondent. 
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Table A4: Replicating Table 6 using a shorter shock window 
 
1 2 
 
migrants 
non-
migrants 
Own negative shock (t-1) -0.143*** -0.172*** 
 (0.032) (0.025) 
Own positive shock (t-1) 0.014 0.027 
 (0.098) (0.061) 
Number of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative 
shock in the network (t-1) 
-0.076*** -0.059** 
 (0.024) (0.027) 
Number of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive 
shock in the network (t-1) 
0.008 -0.062 
 (0.076) (0.047) 
Number of migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in 
the network (t-1) 
0.009 -0.029 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
Number of migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in 
the network (t-1) 
0.051 0.152** 
 (0.074) (0.060) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 0.044*** 0.040*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed -0.002 0.035* 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Other controls? Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,538 4,892 
R2 0.129 0.104 
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.099 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable is log HH per capita consumption. Unit of observation is 
panel respondent.  
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Table A5: Replicating Table 6 using household level data 
 
 
1 2 
 
migrants 
non-
migrants 
own negative shock -0.047 -0.140*** 
 (0.030) (0.024) 
own positive shock 0.096 0.063 
 (0.064) (0.040) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the 
network 
-0.083*** -0.045** 
 (0.022) (0.021) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the 
network 
-0.072 -0.010 
 (0.049) (0.039) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the network 0.013 -0.011 
 (0.022) (0.020) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the network 0.058 0.096** 
 (0.050) (0.038) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 0.051*** 0.050*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed 0.014 0.050*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Other controls? Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,075 2,651 
R2 0.136 0.083 
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.074 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in 
parenthesis.  Dependent variable is log HH per capita consumption. Unit of observation is 
household observed in 2004 or 2010. 
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Table A6: Replicating Table 6 using (log) consumption pre adult equivalent as a 
dependent variable 
 
1 2 
 
migrants 
non-
migrants 
own negative shock -0.082*** -0.181*** 
 (0.029) (0.025) 
own positive shock 0.105* 0.087** 
 (0.058) (0.042) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the 
network 
-0.074*** -0.041* 
 (0.022) (0.024) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the 
network 
-0.055 -0.001 
 (0.053) (0.034) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a negative shock in the network 0.008 -0.002 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a positive shock in the network 0.065 0.074 
 (0.047) (0.046) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 0.050*** 0.052*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed 0.009 0.047** 
 (0.017) (0.019) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
Other controls? Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,538 4,892 
R2 0.126 0.133 
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.129 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in 
parenthesis.  Dependent variable is log HH per adult equivalent consumption. Unit of 
observation is panel respondent. 
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Table A7: Replicating Table 6 using individual level fixed effects 
 
1a 1b 2a 2b 
 
migrants non-migrants 
own negative shock -0.064* -0.089*** -0.172*** -0.203*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) 
own positive shock 0.128** 0.089 0.115*** 0.132*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.043) (0.048) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a negative 
shock in the network 
-0.059** -0.045* -0.049** -0.029 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) 
# of non-migrant HHs that experienced a positive 
shock in the network 
-0.051 -0.054 -0.020 -0.040 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.033) (0.034) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a negative 
shock in the network 
0.017 0.037 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022) 
# of migrant HHs that experienced a positive 
shock in the network 
0.055 0.042 0.093* 0.092* 
 (0.055) (0.067) (0.049) (0.051) 
Number of split-off HHs moved 0.034** 0.029* 0.049*** 0.040*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Number of split-off HHs stayed -0.004 -0.008 0.046** 0.032 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Network Fixed Effects? Yes No Yes No 
Individual level Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes 
Other controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,150 2,150 4,143 4,143 
R2 0.102 0.081 0.106 0.153 
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.076 0.101 0.151 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by network are in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable is log HH per capita consumption. Unit of observation is panel respondent. Sample in 
the ‘migrants’ column is formed of individuals who appear as migrants in 2004 and 2010. Sample in the 
‘non-migrants’ column is formed of individuals who appear as non-migrants in 2004 and 2010. 
 
 
 
